STUDENT NOTE: THE CHANGING CHAPTER 13
PROCEDURAL LANDSCAPE AFTER ESPINOSA
AND CONSEQUENCES
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I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Espinosa1 (“Espinosa”) may give debtors and creditors in a chapter 13
proceeding greater latitude in discharging student loan debt through outof-court agreements. In Espinosa, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court,
affirmed a Ninth Circuit case2 upholding a confirmed chapter 13 plan
that purported to discharge a debtor’s student loan interest if the plan
were successfully consummated, even though no adversary proceeding
had been commenced and no undue hardship determination had been
made by the bankruptcy court.3 Known as a “discharge by declaration”
provision, these clauses within a chapter 13 plan provide for the
discharge of a specific outstanding debt, in this case student loan
interest, once debtors have successfully finished their plan. With the
Espinosa decision, these provisions may grow more commonplace as
debtors with student loans face insolvency and search for means to
resolve their debt without incurring the time, effort, and expense of
pursuing an adversarial proceeding.
Prior to Espinosa, federal circuit courts were split on how to
handle discharge by declaration provisions, some of which can contain
language inconsistent with Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(8), which
mandates a finding of undue hardship before a student loan may be
discharged in whole or in part.4 Some circuits found them objectionable
per se while others allowed those discharge provisions to stand if the
creditor did not object during confirmation proceedings or appeal the
confirmation order. The Tenth Circuit found that a creditor lacked any
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right to challenge such a provision after confirmation if it had not
objected to the provision in the confirmation process or later appealed
the order, heavily emphasizing the importance of finality to an order
confirming a plan. 5 Similarly, in the Ninth Circuit, the court upheld a
confirmed plan because of the creditor’s failure to object or to later
appeal the order. 6 However, the Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits
decided differently, holding that a discharge by declaration provision in a
chapter 13 plan violated a creditor’s due process for lack of adequate
notice when the debtor did not serve the creditor with a summons and
complaint in an adversary proceeding, but instead merely provided
notice of the plan’s confirmation proceedings and the opportunity to
object to confirmation.7
With the Espinosa decision, the Supreme Court clarified how a
discharge by declaration provision should be treated by circuit courts.
The Court stressed that the parties to a chapter 13 agreement can,
outside of the confines of a courtroom, decide and agree among
themselves which of the debtor’s loans would constitute an undue
hardship.8 These arrangements directly benefit debtors: they are shorn of
at least a part of their debts. Similarly, creditors may value these out-ofcourt agreements for the economy of avoiding both financially costly
and time-consuming litigation, in addition to the uncertainty of a judicial
proceeding. The creditor who approves such an agreement is analogous
to the prosecutor who approves a plea bargain, or a litigant who
approves of an out-of-court settlement. These alternatives to litigation
are less expensive, offer a degree of certainty and insulate the parties
from risk of an in-court loss.
II. Student Loan Landscape

There will be no shortage of student debtors in the future. In
recent years, national student loan debt has passed $1 trillion dollars,
held by 38 million students borrowing for college-related expenses. 9
With tuition and fees rising 3.7 percent at private nonprofit colleges and
See generally Andersen v. UNIPAC-NEBHELP (In re Andersen), 179 F.3d 1253 (10th
Cir. 1999).
5

See generally Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Pardee (In re Pardee), 193 F.3d 1083
(9th Cir. 1999).
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See e.g., Ruehle v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Ruehle), 412 F.3d 679 (6th Cir.
2005); In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005); Banks v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp.
(In re Banks), 299 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2002).
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2.9 percent for in-state residents at four-year public schools in 2014,10
student debt will likely continue to increase in coming years and
continue to remain an economic problem. As students take out more
debt, discharge by declaration provisions may grow more widespread as
a viable option for student loan debtors hoping to restore their financial
situation.
Student loan debt impairs a borrower’s ability to participate as a
consumer—borrowers are less likely to purchase homes and less likely to
hold other classes of debt. 11 There is some promise, though, as the
national student loan default rate has decreased to 13.7 in 2014, from
14.7 the year before.12 Furthermore, a range of repayment options are
available to student loan debtors, ranging from a monthly payment fixed
according to the debtor’s adjusted gross income 13 to the more
conventional standard repayment option. 14 Unfortunately, those are
neither salve nor panacea. The greater a graduate’s debt burden, the
greater it will “impair the ability of recent college graduates to qualify for
a loan”15 and impact risk taking in small business formation.16
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III. Implicated Rules, Statutes, and Holdings

Realistically, for most filers, the possibility of discharging student
loans pursuant to a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is remote.17 For student
loans to be discharged, a debtor must show that the debt is an undue
hardship. 18 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“FRBP”)
require an adversary proceeding to establish the dischargeability of a
student loan debt.19 For most would-be chapter 13 filers trying to rid
themselves of their student debts, the debtor must initiate litigation
against their creditor, serving a complaint and summons, engaging in
discovery, motion practice, and, if there are disputes of material fact, trial
and the potential for appeals.
In a chapter 13 proceeding, the court must hold a confirmation
hearing for the chapter 13 plan, during which any party in interest may
object.20 If there are no objections to the plan, the court will confirm the
plan provided three criteria are met. Most noteworthy for the Espinosa
decision that “the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and
with the other applicable provisions of this title” 21 and “the plan has
been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”22
The FRBP governing an adversary proceeding are largely
identical to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) that govern
civil litigation in the district courts. FRBP 700323 is the analog of FRCP
3, which requires that a plaintiff commence a civil action with a
complaint.24 Meanwhile, FRBP 700825 is the analog of FRCP 8, which
governs the form and content a pleading must take. 26 Despite these
similarities, there are some differences, particularly regarding service of a
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (2005) (precluding student loan debt from discharge after
completion of a Chapter 13 payment plan).
17

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2005) (Allowing student loans to be discharged provided that
“unless excepting such debt from discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship on
the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.”).
18
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FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6) (2010).

11 U.S.C. § 1324 (2005) (“[T]he court shall hold a hearing on confirmation of the
plan. A party in interest may object to confirmation of the plan.”).
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11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) (2005). This relates to one of the first issues in the Espinosa
decision, in which the proposed chapter 13 plan was itself inconsistent with the
Bankruptcy Code.
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11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2005).
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FED. R. BANKR. P. 7003 (2014) (“Rule 3 . . . applies in adversary proceedings.”).
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FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (2007).
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FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008 (2014) (“Rule 8 . . . applies in adversary proceedings.”).
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FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (2010).
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summons. Under FRCP 4, a nonparty who is at least 18 years old must
serve a summons with a copy of the complaint,27 unless the defendant
chooses to waive service of process. 28 Under FRBP 7004, the same is
true 29 except that a plaintiff may initiate service by prepaid first class
mail.30 Instead of being an alternative to physical service, the FRBP allow
a plaintiff to establish service of process with prepaid certified mail in
addition to physical service of process.31
Service of process is an integral part of due process. 32
Insufficient service implicates fundamental constitutional rights. 33 In
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 34 the Supreme Court held
that “notice [must be] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.” 35 Notice itself must
rise above “a mere gesture” to meet due process,36 and it “must be of
such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, . . . and it
must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their
appearance.”37 Notice for notice’s sake is insufficient, and it must take
into account the defendant’s circumstances to properly meet due
process.
Failure to satisfy due process in a court proceeding can lead to a
court’s judgment being voided. 38 Under FRCP 60 or FRBP 9024, 39 a
27

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c) (2015).

28

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (2015).

FED. R. BANKR. P 7004(a) (2014) (“Personal service under Rule 4(e)–(j) F.R.Civ.P.
may be made by any person at least 18 years of age who is not a party, and the
summons may be delivered by the clerk to any such person.”).
29

FED. R. BANKR. P 7004(b) (2014) (“[I]n addition to the methods of service
authorized by Rule 4(e)–(j) F.R.Civ.P., service may be made within the United States by
first class mail postage prepaid . . . .”).
30
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See id.

See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (stating that due process required
either personal appearance or personal service of process before a defendant could be
bound by a rendered judgment).
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See also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5) (2009) (allowing a party to submit a motion to
dismiss for insufficient service of process).
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339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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Id. at 314.
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Id. at 315.
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38

FED. R. CIV. P. 60 (2007).
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party on motion can challenge a judgment as void. A court can declare a
judgment void if the court rendering judgment lacked subject matter
jurisdiction40 or if a constitutional right is infringed upon, such as a due
process violation because of inadequate or lack of service of process.41
On the other hand, an erroneous judgment is not a valid basis for a void
judgment.42
IV. Espinosa

In Espinosa, Justice Thomas delivered a unanimous decision
affirming a lower court decision that discharged student loan interest
without commencing an adversarial proceeding and without an undue
hardship determination by the bankruptcy court. 43 In the late 1980s,
Francisco Espinosa took out federal student loans with a total principal
of $13,250.44 Later, he submitted a chapter 13 plan proposing to repay
only the principal on his debts, but not the accrued interest, and
providing that the plan’s completed expiration would discharge the
interest. 45 The court clerk then mailed a copy of Espinosa’s plan to
United Student Aid Funds Inc. (“United”), Espinosa’s creditor, which
did not object to the plan or its proposed discharge of Espinosa’s
student loan interest, even though there was no adversarial proceeding
initiated or determination of undue hardship. 46 Afterward, the
bankruptcy court confirmed the plan.47
Espinosa completed the plan’s payments in 1997, and the
bankruptcy court discharged his student loan interest.48 Three years later,
United sought to collect the interest on Espinosa’s loans. 49 After
Espinosa filed a motion seeking to enforce the 1997 discharge, United
filed a cross-motion under Federal Rule 60(b)(4) to void the bankruptcy
11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2862 (3d ed. 2015) (“[A judgment] is void only if the court that rendered
it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter . . . .”).
40

41

Id. (“[I]f [the court] acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.”).

Id. See also Ingvoldstad v. Kings Wharf Island Enters., 593 F. Supp. 997, 1004 (V.I.
1984). (“[A] judgment is not void and is therefore not within the ambit of Rule 60(b)(4)
simply because it is erroneous.”) (citation omitted).
42

43

See Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1205.

44

Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 264.
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Id.
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Id. at 265.
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Id.
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Id. at 265-66.
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Id. at 266.
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court’s confirmation of Espinosa’s plan on two claims: (1) the provision
in Espinosa’s plan discharging his student loan interest was inconsistent
with the FRBP, and (2) United’s due process rights were violated
because Espinosa failed to serve it with a summons and complaint.50
The Court stated that for a judgment to be rendered void under
Rule 60(b)(4), the judgment must have been “premised either on a
certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that
deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.”51 However,
failing to serve United with a summons and a complaint amounted to
inadequacy only of a procedural right guaranteed by the FRBP, not a
constitutional one.52 Due process need only be tailored to the Mullane
standard. 53 In this case, due process was met when United received
actual notice from the bankruptcy court concerning the filing and
contents of Espinosa’s plan.54 As for the court’s failure to find undue
hardship, that amounted to, at most, legal error not warranting a voided
judgment.55 United, after receiving notice, had opportunity to object or
timely appeal and should not have slept on its rights.56
The Court’s holding went further. In discussions between
creditors and debtors concerning student loans, the parties “may agree
that payment of a student loan debt will cause the debtor an undue
hardship sufficient to justify discharge,” thereby mutually consenting to
undue hardship without initiating an adversary proceeding. 57 A
bankruptcy court would still have to make a determination of undue
hardship to satisfy § 523(a)(8),58 but debtors would no longer need to

50

Id.

51

Id. at 270.

Id. at 272 (“Espinosa's failure to serve United with a summons and complaint
deprived United of a right granted by a procedural rule . . . [t]his deprivation did not
amount to a violation of United's constitutional right to due process.”) (citation
omitted).
52
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See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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Espinosa, 559 U.S. 272.

55

Id. at 274-75.
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Id.

Id. at 278 (“Neither the Code nor the Rules prevent the parties from stipulating to
the underlying facts of undue hardship, and neither prevents the creditor from waiving
service of a summons and complaint.”).
57

Id. (“[T]o comply with § 523(a)(8)’s directive, the bankruptcy court must make an
independent determination of undue hardship before a plan is confirmed, even if the
creditor fails to object or appear in the adversary proceeding.").
58
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initiate litigation against their creditors provided the two can agree that
paying an outstanding student loan would constitute undue hardship.59
V. CONSEQUENCES

With Espinosa’s holding, the Supreme Court has refined its
interpretation of when due process is satisfied in relation to an
adversarial proceeding regarding student loan creditors. Three other
circuits previously held that a student loan creditor was denied due
process when debtors failed to serve a complaint and summons to their
creditors.60 Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski reasoned that
the “constitutional standard, as we understand it, requires that a party
affected by the litigation obtain sufficient notice,” 61 as opposed to the
heightened, and stricter, standard promulgated by the FRBP requiring a
summons and complaint that other circuits have claimed was due to a
creditor. 62 The Espinosa Court stated that due process merely required
notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, echoing the
Mullane standard, and that actual notice satisfied the constitutional
requirement. 63 The rules requiring a summons and complaint
enumerated within the FRBP, however, were procedural rules, not
constitutional ones.64
The Espinosa decision has made it easier for debtors who are
interested in a chapter 13 plan but may be wary of initiating an
adversarial proceeding. The requirements of the FRBP to discharge
student loans are still applicable. In most cases, a debtor wanting to
commence chapter 13 will still have to initiate an adversarial proceeding
and request that a bankruptcy court hold a hearing to create a plan
agreed upon by all interested parties. However, the Espinosa decision has
bolstered the procedural legitimacy of discharge by declaration
provisions by ensuring that a court upholding such a provision will not
59

Id.
We thus assume that, in some cases, a debtor and creditor may agree
that payment of a student loan debt will cause the debtor an undue
hardship sufficient to justify discharge. In such a case, there is no
reason that compliance with the undue hardship requirement should
impose significant costs on the parties or materially delay
confirmation of the plan.
Id.

60

See supra notes 5, 6 and accompanying text.

61

Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1204 (emphasis added).

See supra notes 5, 6 and accompanying text. These circuits required a complaint and
notice served upon a creditor.
62

63

Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 272.

64

Id. See also FED. R. BANKR. P 7004 (2014).
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automatically be a void judgment merely because a creditor was not
served with a summons and complaint.
At least one commentator has stated that the lack of clear
approval or disapproval of a discharge by declaration provision, and the
mere sanction of a court judgment’s finality of ruling concerning the
declaration, may lead to some confusion among the circuits in future
proceedings.65 At the very least, the Espinosa decision will not require a
court to hold as void a provision within a debtor’s confirmation plan
discharging student loans, or similar debt, after successful completion of
the plan provided the creditor had sufficient notice under the Mullane
standard. Nor, for that matter, would a court be required to hold as void
under 60(b)(4) a lower court decision upholding a debtor’s chapter 13
plan even where the creditor is not served with a summons or
complaint. Furthermore, inconsistencies between the chapter 13 plan’s
provisions and the Bankruptcy Code are not themselves sufficient to
overturn a judgment confirming a plan.
The Espinosa decision may allow for underhanded, bad-faith
tactics by practitioners seeking to “slip in” a discharge by declaration
provision, a fear United expressed in Espinosa. 66 The Court, however,
dismissed fears of rampant lawyer misconduct by citing the available
recourse against dishonest advocates and how they “face penalties under
various provisions for engaging in improper conduct in bankruptcy
proceedings.” 67 Attorney wrongdoing is procedurally constrained by
FRBP 1008, 68 which requires lawyers to verify any statement they
make, 69 and sanctions for misrepresentations are enumerated under
FRBP 9011.70 Courts may sanction lawyers who make improper claims,
Ralph Brubaker, Supreme Court Upholds “Discharge by Declaration” of Student Loan Debts in
Chapter 13 (or Does It?), 30 N. 6 BANKR. LAW LETTER 1, 1 (“With respect to whether the
practice itself is or is not appropriate, though, the Court sent mixed signals that will
likely perpetuate extreme nonuniformity in the prevalence of and attitudes toward
discharge-by-declaration.”).
65

Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 278 (“United argues that our failure to declare the Bankruptcy
Court's order void will encourage unscrupulous debtors to abuse the Chapter 13
process by filing plans proposing to dispense with the undue hardship requirement in
the hopes the bankruptcy court will overlook the proposal and the creditor will not
object.”).
66

67

Id. (quoting Taylor v. Freeland, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992)).

68

FED. R. BANKR. P 1008 (1991).

“All petitions, lists, schedules, statements and amendments thereto shall be verified
or contain an unsworn declaration as provided in 28 U.S.C. §1746.” Id.
69

FED. R. BANKR. P 9011 (1997). Attorneys are required to sign any “petition,
pleading, written motion, and other paper, except a list, schedule, or statement, or
amendments.” Id. After notice and reasonable opportunity to respond, the court may
70
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frivolous or unwarranted claims or defenses, or factual claims without
evidentiary on either the opposing counsel’s initiative or the court’s. 71
Additional reproof is available beyond in-court sanctions, such as
professional reprimand by the bar for violating Rule 3.1 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.72 Lawyers who would rely on Espinosa’s
holding as a way to surreptitiously advance an insincere chapter 13 plan
on their client’s behalf, while confounding the due process of the
creditor, are subject to very real and deterring admonishments from a
variety of sources.
Notwithstanding a lawyer’s malfeasance, the Espinosa decision
provides a new method of discharging loans to debtors entertaining the
idea of chapter 13 bankruptcy. Those debtors wary of an adversarial
proceeding may negotiate with their creditor to establish a plan that
could mitigate their student loan burden. Additionally, the Espinosa
decision is an opportunity for debtors and creditors to voluntarily
remove the uncertainty inherent in litigation, specifically that which
arose from the circuit split concerning judicial determinations of undue
hardship. Student loan creditors can now negotiate with debtors a
favorable plan that can help creditors better recoup a portion of the
outstanding debt while letting debtors and creditors avoid the additional
expense of litigation. By upholding discharge agreements between
parties in interest without recourse to an adversarial proceeding or
undue hardship determination, debtors and creditors can agree among
themselves on an appropriate plan concerning loans and whether
discharge is practicable.
VI. Conclusion

Student loan debt is a rising problem that seriously affects
spending decisions by debtors. Fewer graduates are able to purchase a
house or participate in forming businesses when loan payments replace a
part of their discretionary spending. Repayment options are available,
but do little to help debtors whose loans may be wildly out of
proportion to their income. The Bankruptcy Code provides for the
discharge of student loans under chapter 13, but only if the debtor is
willing to enter into an adversarial proceeding and all parties in interest
impose sanctions on motions or sua sponte. Id. These sanctions, however, are “limited
to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated” and may be monetary or otherwise. Id.
71

Id.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.1. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT 1.3 cmt. 1 (“The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not
require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in
the legal process with courtesy and respect.”).
72
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can agree on a proposed payment plan. With the Supreme Court’s
decision in Espinosa, creditors and debtors can avoid the uncertainty of
litigation and agree among themselves as to whether a certain student
loan constitutes undue hardship.

